DRI-183 for week of 3-1-15: George Orwell, Call Your Office – The FCC Curtails Internet Freedom In Order to Save It

An Access Advertising EconBrief:

George Orwell, Call Your Office – The FCC Curtails Internet Freedom In Order to Save It

February 26, 2015 is a date that will live in regulatory infamy. That assertion is subject to revision by the courts, as is nearly everything undertaken these days by the Obama administration. As this is written, the Supreme Court hears yet another challenge to “ObamaCare,” the Affordable Care Act. President Obama’s initiative to achieve a single-payer system of national health care in the U.S. is rife with Orwellian irony, since it cannot help but make health care unaffordable for everybody by further removing the consumer of health care from every exposure to the price of health care. Similarly, the latest administration initiative is the February 26 approval by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the so-called “Net Neutrality” doctrine in regulatory form. Commission Chairman Tom Wheeler’s summary of his regulatory proposal – consisting of 332 pages that were withheld from the public – has been widely characterized as a proposal to “regulate the Internet like a public utility.”

This episode is riven with a totalitarian irony that only George Orwell could fully savor. The FCC is ostensibly an independent regulatory body, free of political control. In fact, Chairman Wheeler long resisted the “net neutrality” doctrine (hereinafter, shortened to “NN” for convenience). The FCC’s decision was a response to pressure from President Obama, which made a mockery of the agency’s independence. The alleged necessity for NN arises from the “local monopoly” over “high-speed” broadband exerted by Internet service providers (again, hereinafter abbreviated as “ISPs”) – but a “public utility” was, and is, by definition a regulated monopoly. Since the alleged local monopoly held by ISPs is itself fictitious, the FCC is in fact proposing to replace competition with monopoly.

To be sure, the particulars of Chairman Wheeler’s proposal are still open to conjecture. And the enterprise is wildly illogical on its face. The idea of “regulating the Internet like a public utility” treats those two things as equivalent entities. A public utility is a business firm. But the Internet is not a single business firm; indeed, it is not a single entity at all in the concrete sense. In the business sense, “the Internet” is shorthand for an infinite number of existing and potential business firms serving the world’s consumers in countless ways. The clause “regulate the Internet like a public utility” is quite literally meaningless – laughably indefinite, overweening in its hubris, frightening in its totalitarian implications.

It falls to an economist, former FCC Chief Economist Thomas Hazlett of Clemson University, to sculpt this philosophy into its practical form. He defines NN as “a set of rules… regulating the business model of your local ISP.” In short, it is a political proposal that uses economic language to prettify and conceal its real intentions. NN websites are emblazoned with rhetoric about “protecting the Open Internet” – but the Internet has thrived on openness for over 20 years under the benign neglect of government regulators. This proposal would end that era.

There is no way on God’s green earth to equate a regulated Internet with an open Internet; the very word “regulated” is the antithesis of “open.” NN proponents paint scary scenarios about ISPs “blocking or interfering with traffic on the Internet,” but their language is always conditional and hypothetical. They are posing scenarios that might happen in the future, not ones that threaten us today. Why? Because competition and innovation protected consumers up to now and continue to do so. NN will make its proponents’ scary predictions more likely, not less, because it will restrict competition. That is what regulation does in general; that is what public-utility regulation specifically does. For over a century, public-utility regulation has installed a single firm as a regulated monopoly in a particular market and has forcefully suppressed all attempts to compete with that firm.

Of course, that is not what President Obama, Chairman Wheeler and NN proponents want us to envision when we hear the words “regulate the Internet like a public utility.” They want us to envision a lovely, healthy flock of sheep grazing peacefully in a beautiful meadow, supervised by a benevolent, powerful Shepherd with a herd of well-trained, affectionate shepherd dogs at his command. Soothing music is piped down from heaven and love and tranquility reign. At the far edges of the meadow, there is a forest. Hungry wolves dwell within, eyeing the sheep covetously. But they dare not approach, for they fear the power of the Shepherd and his dogs.

In other words, the Obama administration is trying to manipulate the emotions of the electorate by creating an imaginary vision of public-utility regulation. The reality of public-utility regulation was, and is, entirely different.

The Natural-Monopoly Theory of Public-Utility Regulation

The history of public-utility regulation is almost, but not quite, co-synchronous with that of government regulation of business in the United States. Regulation began at the state level with Munn vs. Illinois, which paved the way for state government of the grain business in the 1870s. The Interstate Commerce Commission’s inaugural voyage with railroad regulation followed in the late 1880s. With the commercial introduction of electric lighting and the telephone came business firms tailored to those ends. And in their wake came the theory of natural monopoly.

Both electric power and telephones came to be known as “natural monopoly” industries; that is, industries in which both economic efficiency and commercial viability chose one single firm to serve the entire market. This was the outgrowth of economies of scale in production, owing to decreasing long-run average cost of production. This decidedly unusual state of affairs is a technological anomaly. Engineers recognize it in conjunction with the “two-thirds rule.” There are certain cases in which cost increases as the two-thirds power of output, which implies that cost decreases steadily as output rises. (The thru-put of pipes and cables and the capacity of cargo holds are examples.) In turn, this implies that the firm that grows the fastest will undersell all others while still covering all its costs. The further implication is that consumers will receive the most output at the lowest price if one monopoly firm serves everybody – if, and only if, the firm’s price can be constrained equal to its long-run average cost at the rate of output necessary to meet market demand. An unconstrained monopoly would produce less than this optimal rate of output and charge a higher price, in order to maximize its profit. But the theoretical outcome under regulated monopoly equates price with long-run average cost, which provides the utility with a rate of return equal to what it could get in the best alternative use for its financial capital, given its business risk.

In the U.S. and Canada, this regulated outcome is sought by a public-utility commission via the medium of periodic hearings staged by the public-utility regulatory commission (PUC for short). The utility is privately owned by shareholders. In Europe, utilities are not privately owned. Instead, their prices are (in principle) set equal to long-run marginal cost, which is below the level of average cost and thus constitutes a loss in accounting terms. Taxpayers subsidize this loss – these subsidies are the alternative to the profits earned by regulated public-utility firms in the U.S. and Canada.

These regulatory schemes represent the epitome of what the Nobel laureate Ronald Coase called “blackboard economics” – economists micro-managing reality as if they possessed all the information and control over reality that they do when drawing diagrams on a classroom blackboard. In practice, things did not work out as neatly as the foregoing summary would lead us to believe. Not even remotely close, in fact.

The Myriad Slips Twixt Theoretical Cup and Regulatory Lip

What went wrong with this theoretical set-up, seemingly so pat when viewed in a textbook or on a classroom blackboard? Just about everything, to some degree or other. Today, we assume that the institution of regulated monopoly came in response to market monopolies achieved and abuses perpetrated by electric and telephone companies. What mostly happened, though, was different. There were multiple providers of electricity and telephone service in the early days. In exchange for submitting to rate-of-return regulation, though, one firm was extended a grant of monopoly and other firms were excluded. Only in very rare cases did competition exist for local electric service – and curiously, this rate competition actually produced lower electric rates than did public-utility regulation.

This result was not the anomaly it seemed, since the supposed economies of scale were present only in the distribution of electric power, not in power generation. So the cost superiority of a single firm producing for the whole market turned out to be not the slam-dunk that was advertised. That was just one of many cracks in the façade of public-utility regulation. Over the course of the 20th century, the evolution of public-utility regulation in telecommunications proved to be paradigmatic for the failures and inherent shortcomings of the form.

Throughout the country, the Bell system were handed a monopoly on the provision of local service. Its local service companies – the analogues to today’s ISPs – gradually acquired reputations as the heaviest political hitters in state-government politics. The high rates paid by consumers bought lobbyists and legislators by the gross, and they obediently safeguarded the monopoly franchise and kept the public-utility commissions (PUCs) staffed with tame members. That money also paid the bill for a steady diet of publicity designed to mislead the public about the essence of public-utility regulation.

We were assured by the press that the PUC was a vigilant watchdog whose noble motives kept the greedy utility executives from turning the rate screws on a helpless public. At each rate hearing, self-styled consumer advocacy groups paraded their compassion for consumers by demanding low rates for the poor and high rates on business – as if it were really possible for some non-human entity called “business” to pay rates in the true sense, any more than they could pay taxes. PUCs made a show of ostentatiously requiring the utility to enumerate its costs and pretending to laboriously calculate “just and reasonable” rates – as if a Commission possessed juridical powers denied to the world’s greatest philosophers and moralists.

Behind the scenes, after the press had filed their poker-faced stories on the latest hearings, increasingly jaded and cynical reporters, editors and industry consultants rolled their eyes and snorted at the absurdity of it all. Utilities quickly learned that they wouldn’t be allowed to earn big “profits,” because this would be cosmetically bad for the PUC, the consumer advocates, the politicians and just about everybody involved in this process. So executives, middle-level managers and employees figured out that they had to make their money differently than they would if working for an ordinary business in the private sector. Instead of working efficiently and productively and striving to maximize profit, they would strive to maximize cost instead. Why? Because they could make money from higher costs in the form of higher salaries, higher wages, larger staffs and bigger budgets. What about the shareholders, who would ordinarily be shafted by this sort of behavior? Shareholders couldn’t lose because the PUC was committed to giving them a rate of return sufficient to attract financial capital to the industry. (And the shareholders couldn’t gain from extra diligence and work effort put forward by the company because of the limitation on profits.) That is, the Commission would simply ratchet up rates commensurate with any increase in costs – accompanied by whatever throat-clearing, phony displays of concern for the poor and cost-shifting shell games were necessary to make the numbers work. In the final analysis, the name of the game was inefficiency and consumers always paid for it – because there was nobody else who could pay.

So much for the vaunted institution of public-utility regulation in the public interest. Over fifty years ago, a famous left-wing economist named Gardiner Means proposed subjecting every corporation in the U.S. to rate-of-return regulation by the federal government. This held the record for most preposterous policy program advanced by a mainstream commentator – until Thomas Wheeler announced that henceforth the Internet would be regulated as if it were a public utility. Now every American will get a taste of life as Ivan Denisovich, consigned to the Gulag Archipelago of regulatory bureaucracy.

Of particular significance to us in today’s climate is the effect of this regime on innovation. Outside of totalitarian economies such as the Soviet Union and Communist China, public-utility regulation is the most stultifying climate for innovation ever devised by man. The idea behind innovation is to find ways to produce more goods using the same amount of inputs or (equivalently) the same amount of goods using fewer inputs. Doing this lowers costs – which increases profits. But why do to the trouble if you can’t enjoy the increase in profits? Of course, utilities were willing to spend money on research, provided they could get it in the rate base and earn a rate of return on the investment. But they had no incentive to actually implement any cost-saving innovations. The Bell System was legendary for its unwillingness to lower its costs; the economic literature is replete with jaw-dropping examples of local Bell companies lagging years and even decades behind the private sector in technology adoption – even spurning advances developed in Bell’s own research labs!

Any reader who suspects this writer of exaggeration is invited to peruse the literature of industrial organization and regulation. One nagging question should be dealt with forthwith. If the demerits of public-utility regulation were well recognized by insiders, how were they so well concealed from the public? The answer is not mysterious. All of those insiders had a vested interest in not blowing the whistle on the process because they were making money from ongoing public-utility regulation. Commission employees, consultants, expert witnesses, public-interest lawyers and consumer advocates all testified at rate hearings or helped prepare testimony or research it. They either worked full-time or traveled the country as contractors earning lucrative hourly pay. If any one of them was crazy enough to launch an expose of the public-utility scam, he or she would be blackballed from the business while accomplishing nothing – the institutional inertia in favor of the system was so enormous that it would have taken mass revolt to effect change. So they just shrugged, took the money and grew more cynical by the year.

In retrospect, it seems miraculous that anything did change. In the 1960s, local Bell companies were undercharging for local service to consumers and compensating by soaking business and long-distance customers with high prices. The high long-distance rates eventually attracted the interest of would-be competitors. One government regulator grew so fed up with the inefficiency of the Bell system that he granted the competitive petition of a small company called MCI, which sought to compete only in the area of long-distance telecommunications. MCI was soon joined by other firms. The door to competition had been cracked slightly ajar.

In the 1980s, it was kicked wide open. A federal antitrust lawsuit against AT&T led to the breakup of the firm. At the time, the public was dubious about the idea that competition was possible in telecommunications. The 1990s soon showed that regulators were the only ones standing between the American public and a revolution unlike anything we had seen in a century. After vainly trying to protect the local Bells against competition, regulators finally succumbed to the inevitable – or rather, they were overrun by the competitive hordes. When the public got used to cell phones and the Internet, they ditched good old Ma Bell and land-line phones.

This, then, is public-utility regulation. The only reason we have smart phones and mobile Internet access today is that public-utility regulation in telecommunications was overrun by competition despite regulatory opposition in the 1990s. But public-utility regulation is the wonderful fate to which Barack Obama, Thomas Wheeler and the FCC propose to consign the Internet. What is the justification for their verdict?

The Case for Net Neutrality – Debunked

As we have seen, public-utility regulation was based on a premise that certain industries were “natural monopolies.” But nobody has suggested that the Internet is a natural monopoly – which makes sense, since it isn’t an industry. Nobody has suggested that all or even some of the industries that utilize the Internet are natural monopolies – which makes sense, since they aren’t. So why in God’s name should we subject them to public-utility regulation – especially since public-utility regulation didn’t even work well in the industries for which it was ideally suited? We shouldn’t.

The phrase “net neutrality” is designed to achieve an emotional effect through alliteration and a carefully calculated play on the word “neutral.” In this case, the word is intended to appeal to egalitarian sympathies among hearers. It’s only fair, we are urged to think, that ISPs, the “gatekeepers” of the Internet, are scrupulously fair or “neutral” in letting everybody in on the same terms. And, as with so many other issues in economics, the case for “fairness” becomes just so much sludge upon closer examination.

The use of the term “gatekeepers” suggests that God handed to Moses on Mount Olympus a stone tablet for the operation of the Internet, on which ISPs were assigned the role of “gatekeepers.” Even as hyperbolic metaphor, this bears no relation to reality. Today, cable companies are ISPs. But they began life as monopoly-killers. In the early 1960s, Americans chose between three monopoly VHF-TV networks, broadcast by ABC, NBC and CBS. Gradually, local UHF stations started to season the diet of content-starved viewers. When cable-TV came along, it was like manna from heaven to a public fed up with commercials and ravenous for sports and movies. But government regulators didn’t allow cable-TV to compete with VHF and UHF in the top 100 media markets of the U.S. for over two decades. As usual, regulators were zealously protecting government monopoly, restricting competition and harming consumers.

Eventually, cable companies succeeded in tunneling their way into most local markets. They did it by bribing local government literally and figuratively – the latter by splitting their profits via investment in pet political projects of local politicians as part of their contracts. In return, they were guaranteed various degrees of exclusivity. But this “monopoly” didn’t last because they eventually faced competition from telecommunication firms who wanted to get into their business and whose business the cable companies wanted to invade. And today, the old structural definitions of monopoly simply don’t apply to the interindustry forms of competition that prevail.

Take the Kansas City market. Originally, Time Warner had a monopoly franchise. But eventually a new cable company called Everest invaded the metro area across the state line in Johnson County, KS. Overland Park is contiguous with Kansas City, MO, and consumers were anxious to escape the toils of Time Warner. Eventually, Everest prevailed upon KC, MO to gain entry to the Missouri side. Now even the cable-TV market was competitive. Then Google selected Kansas City, KS as the venue for its new high-speed service. Soon KC, MO was included in that package, too – now there were three local ISPs! (Everest has morphed into two successive incarnations, one of which still serves the area.)

Although this is not typical, it does not exhaust the competitive alternatives. This is only the picture for fixed service. Americans are now turning to mobile forms of access to the Internet, such as smart phones. Smart watches are on the horizon. For mobile access, the ISP is a wireless company like AT&T, Verizon, Sprint or T-Mobile.

The NN websites stridently maintain that “most Americans have only a single ISP.” This is nonsense; a charitable interpretation would be that most of us have only a single cable-TV provider in our local market. But there is no necessary one-to-one correlation between “cable-TV provider” and “ISP.” Besides, the state of affairs today is ephemeral – different from what is was a few years ago and from what it will be a few years from now. It is only under public-utility regulation that technology gets stuck in one place because under public-utility regulation there is no incentive to innovate.

More specifically, the FCC’s own data suggest that 80% of Americans have two or more ISPs offering 10Mbps downstream speeds. 96% have two or more ISPs offering 6Mbps downstream and 1.5 upstream speeds. (Until quite recently, the FCC’s own criterion for “high-speed” Internet was 4Mbps or more.) This simply does not comport with any reasonable structural concept of monopoly.

The current flap over “blocking and interfering with traffic on the Internet” is the residue of disputes between Netflix and ISPs over charges for transmission of the former’s streaming services. In general, there is movement toward higher charges for data transmission than for voice transmission. But the huge volumes of traffic generated by Netflix cause congestion, and the free-market method for handling congestion is a higher price, or the functional equivalent. That is what economists have recommended for dealing with road congestion during rush hours and congested demand for air-conditioning and heating services at peak times of day and during peak seasons. Redirecting demand to the off-peak is not a monopoly response; it is an efficient market response. Competitive bar and restaurant owners do it with their pricing methods; competitive movie theater owners also do it (or used to).

Similar logic applies to other forms of hypothetically objectionable behavior by ISPs. The prioritization of traffic, creation of “fast” and “slow” lanes, blocking of content – these and other behaviors are neither inherently good nor bad. They are subject to the constraints of competition. If they are beneficial on net balance, they will be vindicated by the market. That is why we have markets. If a government had to vet every action by every business for moral worthiness in advance, it would paralyze life as we know it. The only sensible course is to allow free markets and competition to police the activities of competitors.

Just as there is nothing wrong or untoward with price differentials based on usage, there is nothing virtuous about government-enforced pricing equality. Forcing unequals to be treated equally is not meritorious. NN proponents insist that the public has to be “protected” from that kind of treatment. But this is exactly what PUCs did for decades when they subsidized residential consumers inefficiently by soaking business and long-distance users with higher rates. Back then, the regulatory mantra wasn’t “net neutrality,” it was “universal service.” Ironically, regulators never succeeded in achieving rates of household telephone subscription that exceeded the rate of household television service. Consumers actually needed – but didn’t get – protection from the public-utility monopoly imposed upon them. Today, consumers don’t need protection because there is no monopoly, nor is there any prospect of one absent regulatory intervention. The only remaining vestige of monopoly is that remaining from the grants of local cable-TV monopoly given by municipal governments. Compensating for past mistakes by local government is no excuse for making a bigger mistake by granting monopoly power to FCC regulators.


The late, great economist Frank Knight once remarked that he had heard do-gooders utter the equivalent words to “I want power to do good” so many times for so long that he automatically filtered out the last three words, leaving only “I want power.” Federal-government regulators want the maximum amount of power with the minimum number of restrictions, leaving them the maximum amount of flexibility in the exercise of their power. To get that, they have learned to write excuses into their mandates. In the case of NN and Internet regulation, the operative excuse is “forbearance.”

Forbearance is the writing on the hand with which they will wave away all the objections raised in this essay. The word appears in the original Title II regulations. It means that regulators aren’t required to enforce the regulations if they don’t want to; they can “forebear.” “Hey, don’t worry – be happy. We won’t do the bad stuff, just the good stuff – you know, the ‘neutrality’ stuff, the ‘equality’ stuff.” Chairman Wheeler is encouraging NN proponents to fill the empty vessel of Internet regulation with their own individual wish-fulfillment fantasies of what they dream a “public-utility” should be, not what the ugly historical reality tells us public-utility regulation actually was. For example, he has implied that forbearance will cut out things like rate-of-return regulation.

This just begs the questions raised by the issue of “regulating the Internet like a public utility.” The very elements that Wheeler proposes to forbear constitute part and parcel of public-utility regulation as we have known it. If these are forborne, we have no basis for knowing what to expect from the concept of Internet public-utility regulation at all. If they are not, after all, forborne – then we are back to square one, with the utterly dismal prospect of replaying 20th-century public-utility regulation in all its cynical inefficiency.

Forbearance is a good idea, all right – so good that we should apply it to the whole concept of Internet regulation by the federal government. We should forbear completely.

DRI-291 for week of 7-27-14: How to Debate Bill Moyers

An Access Advertising EconBrief:

How to Debate Bill Moyers

In the course of memorializing a fellow economist who died young, Milton Friedman observed that “we are all of us teachers.” He meant the word in more than the academic sense. Even those economists who live and work outside the academy are still required to inculcate economic fundamentals in their audience. The general public knows less about economics than a pig knows about Sunday – a metaphor justly borrowed from Harry Truman, whose opinion of economists was famously low.

Successful teachers quickly sense that they have entered their persuasive skills into a rhetorical contest with the students’ inborn resistance to learning. Economists face the added handicap that most people overrate their own understanding of the subject matter and are reluctant to jettison the emotional baggage that hinders their absorption of economic logic.

All this puts an economist behind the eight-ball as educator. But in public debate, economists usually find themselves frozen against the rail as well (to continue the analogy with pocket billiards). The most recent case of this competitive disadvantage was the appearance by Arthur C. Brooks, titular head of the conservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI), on the PBS interview program hosted by longtime network fixture Bill Moyers.

Brooks vs. Moyers: An Unequal Contest

At first blush, one might consider the pairing of Brooks, seasoned academic, Ph D. and author of ten books, with Moyers, onetime divinity student and ordained minister who left the ministry for life in politics and journalism, to be an unequal contest. And so it was. Brooks spent the program figuratively groping for a handhold on his opponent while Moyers railed against Brooks with abandon. It seemed clear that each had different objectives. Moyers was insistent on painting conservatives (directly) and Brooks (indirectly) as insensitive, unfeeling and uncaring, while Brooks seemed content that he understood the defensive counterarguments he made in his behalf, even if nobody else did.

Moyers never lost sight of the fact that he was performing to an audience whose emotional buttons he knew from memory and long experience. Brooks was speaking to a critic in his own head rather than playing to an alien house whose sympathies were presumptively hostile.

To watch with a rooting interest in Brooks’ side of the debate was to risk death from utter frustration. In this case, the only balm of Gilead lies in restaging Brooks’ reactions to Moyers’ sallies. This should amount to a debater’s handbook for economists in dealing with the populists of the hard political left wing.

Who is Bill Moyers?

It is important for any debater to know his opponent going into the debate. Moyers is careful to put up a front as an honest broker in ideas. Brooks’ appearance on Moyers’ show is headlined as “Arthur C. Brooks: The Conscience of a Compassionate Conservative,” as if to suggest that Moyers is giving equal time in good faith to an ideological opponent.

This is sham and pretense. Bill Moyers is a professional hack who has spent his whole life in the service of the political left wing. While in his teens, he became a political intern to Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson. After acquiring a B.A. degree in journalism from the University of Texas at Austin, Moyers got an M.A. from the Southwest Baptist Theological Seminary in Fort Worth, Texas. After ordination, he forsook the ministry for a career in journalism and left-wing politics, two careers that have proved largely indistinguishable for over the last few decades. He served in the Peace Corps from 1961-63 before joining the Johnson Administration, serving as LBJ’s Press Secretary from 1965-67. He performed various dirty tricks under Johnson’s direction, including spearheading an FBI investigation of Goldwater campaign aides to uncover usable dirt for the 1964 Presidential campaign. (Apparently, only one traffic violation and one illicit love affair were unearthed among the fifteen staffers.) A personal rift with Johnson led to his resignation in 1967. Moyers edited the Long Island publication Newsday for three years and he alternated between broadcast journalism (PBS, CBS, back to PBS) and documentary-film production thereafter until his elevation to the presidency of the SchumanCenter for Media and Democracy in 1990. Now 80 years old, he occupies a position best described as “political-hack emeritus.”

With this resume under his belt, Moyers cannot maintain any pretense as an honest broker in ideas, his many awards and honorary degrees notwithstanding. After all, the work of America’s leading investigative reporters, James Steele and Donald Barlett, has been exposed in this space as shockingly inept and politically tendentious. Journalists are little more than political advocates and Bill Moyers has thrived in this climate.

In the 1954 movie Night People, Army military intelligence officer Gregory Peck enlightens American politician Broderick Crawford about the true nature of the East German Communists who have kidnapped Crawford’s son. “These are cannibals…bloodthirsty cannibals who are trying to eat us up,” Peck insists. That describes Bill Moyers and his ilk, who are among those aptly characterized by F.A. Hayek as the “totalitarians in our midst.”

This is the light in which Arthur Brooks should have viewed his debate with Bill Moyers. Unfortunately, Brooks seemed stuck in defensive mode. His emphasis on “conscience” and “compassion” seemed designed to stress that he had a conscience – why leave the inference that this was in doubt? – and that he was a compassionate conservative – as opposed to what other kind, exactly? Thus, he began by giving hostages to the enemy before even sitting down to debate.

Brooks spent the interview crouched in this posture of defense, thereby guaranteeing that he would lose the debate even if he won the argument.

Moyers’ Talking Points – and What Brooks Should Have Said

Moyers’ overall position can be summarized in terms of what the great black Thomas Sowell has called “volitional economics.” The people Moyers disapproves of – that is, right-wingers and owners of corporations – have bad intentions and are, ipso facto, responsible for the ills and bad outcomes of the world.

Moyers: “Workers at Target, McDonald’s and Wal-Mart need food stamps to survive…Wal-Mart pays their workers so little that their average worker depends on $4,000 per year in government subsidies.”

Brooks: “Well, we could pay them a higher minimum wage – then they would be unemployed and be completely on the public dole…”

Moyers: “Because the owners of Wal Mart would not want to pay them that higher minimum wage [emphasis added].


WHAT BROOKS SHOULD HAVE SAID: “Wait a minute. Did you just say that the minimum wage causes higher unemployment because business owners don’t want to pay it? Is that right? [Don’t go on until he agrees.] So if the business owners just went ahead and paid all their low-skilled employees the higher minimum wage instead of laying off some of them, everything would be fine, right? That’s what your position is? [Make him agree.]


[When he finishes sputtering:] You aren’t going to do it, are you? You certainly can’t claim that Bill Moyers doesn’t have the money to buy a franchise and hire a manager to run it. And you certainly can’t claim that the left-wing millionaires and billionaires of the world don’t have the money -not with Tom Steyer spending a hundred million dollars advertising climate change. The minimum wage has been in force since the 1930s and the left-wing has been singing its praises for my whole life – but when push comes to shove the left-wing businessmen pay the same wages as the right-wing businessmen. Why? Because they don’t want to go broke, that’s why.

WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO SAY THIS: The audience for Bill Moyers’ program consists mainly of people who agree with Bill Moyers; that is, of economic illiterates who do their reasoning with their gall bladders. It is useless to use formal economic logic on them because they are impervious to it. It is futile to cite studies on the minimum wage because the only studies they care about are the recent ones – dubious in the extreme – that claim to prove the minimum wage has only small adverse effects on employment.

The objective with these people is roughly the same as with Moyers himself: take them out of their comfort zone. There is no way they can fail to understand the idea of doing what Moyers himself advocates because it is what they themselves claim to want. All Brooks would be saying is: Put your money where your mouth is. This is the great all-purpose American rebuttal. And he would be challenging people known to have money, not the poor and downtrodden.

This is the most straightforward, concrete, down-to-earth argument. There is no way to counter it or reply to it. Instead of leaving Brooks at best even with Moyers in a “he-said, he-said” sort of swearing contest, it would have left him on top of the argument with his foot on Moyers’ throat, looking down. At most, Moyers could have limply responded with, “Well, I might just do that,” or some such evasion.

Moyers: “Just pay your workers more… [But] instead of paying a living wage… [owners] do stock buy-backs…”

Brooks: [ignores the opportunity].

WHAT BROOKS SHOULD HAVE SAID: “Did you just use the phrase ‘LIVING WAGE,’ Mr. Moyers? Would you please explain just exactly what a LIVING WAGE is? [From here on, the precise language will depend on the exact nature of his response, but the general rebuttal will follow the same pattern as below.] Is this LIVING WAGE a BIOLOGICAL LIVING WAGE? I mean, will workers DIE if they don’t receive it? But they don’t have it NOW, right? And they’re NOT dying, right? So the term as you use it HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH LIVING OR DYING, does it? It’s just a colorful term that you use because you hope it will persuade people to agree with you by getting them to feel sorry for workers, isn’t it?

There are over 170 countries in the world, Mr. Moyers. In almost all of those countries, low-skilled workers work for lower wages than they do here in the United States. Did you know that? In many countries, low-skilled workers earn the equivalent of less than $1,000 per year in U.S. dollars. In a few countries, they earn just a few hundred dollars worth of dollar-equivalent wages per year. PER YEAR, Mr. Moyers. For you to sit here and use the term “LIVING WAGE” for a wage THIRTY TO FIFTY TIMES HIGHER THAN THE WAGE THEY EARN IS POSITIVELY OBSCENE. Don’t you agree, MR. MOYERS? They don’t die either – BUT I BET THEY GET PRETTY HUNGRY SOMETIMES. What do you bet – MR. MOYERS?

WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO SAY THIS: The phrase “living wage” has been a left-wing catch-phrase longer than most people today have been alive. Its use is “free” because users are never challenged to explain or defend it. It sounds good because it has a nice ring of urgency and necessity to it. But upon close examination it disintegrates like toilet tissue in a bowl. There is no such wage as a wage necessary to sustain life in the biological sense. For one thing, it would vary across a fairly wide range depending on various factors ranging from climate to gender to race to nutrition to prices to wealth to…well, the factors are numerous. It would also be a function of time. Occasionally, classical economists like David Ricardo and Karl Marx would broach the issue, but they never answered any of the basic questions; they just assumed them away in the time-honored manner of economists everywhere. For them, any concept of a living wage was pure theoretical or algebraic, not concrete or numerical. Today, for the left wing, the living wage is purely a polemical concept with zero concreteness. It is merely a club to beat the right wing with. It is without real-world significance or content.

Given this, it is madness to allow your debate opponent the use of this club. Take the club away from him and use it against him.

Bill Moyers: “Wal Mart, which earned $17 billion in profit last year…”

Arthur Brooks: [gives no sign of noticing or caring].

WHAT ARTHUR BROOKS SHOULD HAVE SAID: “You just said that Wal Mart earned $17 billion in profit last year. You did say that, didn’t you – I don’t want to be accused of misquoting you. Does that seem like a lot of money to you? [He will respond affirmatively.] Why? Is it a record of some kind? Did somebody tell you it was a lot of money? Or does it just sort of sound like a lot? I’m asking this because you seem to think that sum of money has a lot of significance, as though it were a crime, or a sin, or special in some way. You seem to think it justifies special notice on your part. You seem to think it justifies your demanding that Wal Mart pay higher wages to their workers than they’re doing now. And my question is: WHY? Unless my ears deceive me, you seem to be making these claims on the basis of the PURE SIZE of the amount. You think Wal Mart should “give” some of this money to its low-skilled workers – is that right? [He will agree enthusiastically.]



And you can deduct it from your income tax as a charitable contribution…MR. MOYERS.

As far as that’s concerned, as a matter of logic, if Wal-Mart’s workers really agree with you that Wal-Mart is scrooging away in profits the money that should go to them in wages, then the workers could do the same thing, couldn’t they? They could buy Wal-Mart’s stock and earn that share of the profit that you want the company to give them. It’s no good claiming they don’t have the money to do it because they’d not only be getting a share of these profits you say are so fabulous, they’d also be owning the company that you’re claiming is such a super profit machine that it’s got profits to burn – or give away. If what you say is really true, you should be screaming at Wal-Mart’s workers to buy shares instead of wasting time trying to get the government to take money away from Wal-Mart so some of it can trickle down to the workers.

Of course, that’s the catch. I don’t even know if YOU YOURSELF BELIEVE THE BALONEY YOU’VE BEEN SPREADING AROUND IN THIS INTERVIEW. I don’t think you even know the truth about all three of those companies that you claim are so flush with profits. To varying degrees, they’re actually in trouble, MR. MOYERS. It’s all in the financial press, MR MOYERS – which you apparently haven’t read and don’t care to read. McDonald’s has had to reinvent itself to recover its sales. Wal-Mart is floundering. Target has lost touch with its core customers. And the $17 billion that seems like so much profit to you doesn’t constitute such a great rate of return when you spread it over the hundreds of thousands of individual Wal Mart shareholders – as you’re about to find out when you take my advice to put your money where you great big mouth is – MR. MOYERS.

WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO SAY THIS: The mainstream press has been minting headlines out of absolute corporate profits for decades. The most prominent victim of this has been the oil companies because they have been the biggest private companies in the world. Any competent economist knows that it is the rate of return that reveals true profitability, not the absolute size of profits. Incredibly, this fact has not permeated to the public consciousness despite the popularity of 401k retirement-investment accounts.

Buying Wal-Mart stock is just another way of implementing the “put your money where your mouth is” strategy discussed earlier. If Bill Moyers’ view of the company were correct – which it isn’t, of course – it would make much more sense than redistributing money via other forms of government coercion.

The Goal of Debate

If you play poker and nobody ever calls your bluff, it will pay you to bluff on the slightest excuse. In debate, you have to call your debate opponent’s bluffs; otherwise, you will be bluffed down to your underwear even when your opponent isn’t holding any cards. Arthur Brooks was just as conservative in his debating style as in his ideology – he refused to call even Moyers’ most ridiculous bluffs. This guaranteed that the best outcome he could hope for was a draw even if his performance was otherwise flawless. It wasn’t, so he came off poorly.

Of course, he was never going to “win” the debate in the sense of persuading hard-core leftists to convert to a right-wing position. His job was to leave them shaken and uncomfortable by denying Bill Moyers the ease and comfort of taking his usual polemical stances without fear of challenge or rebuttal. This would have delighted the few right-wingers tuned in and put the left on notice that they were going to be bloodied when they tried their customary tactics in the future. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to do two things. First, take the battle to Bill Moyers on his own level by forcing him to take his own advice, figuratively speaking. Second, clearly indicate by your contemptuous manner that you do not respect him and are not treating him as an intellectual equal and an honest broker of ideas. People react not only to what you say but to how you say it. If you respect your opponent, they will sense it and accord him that same respect. If you despise him, this will come through – as it should in this case. That is just as important as the intellectual part of the debate.

In a life-and-death struggle with cannibals, not getting eaten alive can pass for victory.