DRI-271 for week of 1-13-13: How (Not) to Help Orphans

An Access Advertising EconBrief:

How (Not) to Help Orphans

The current issue of Great Britain’s venerable weekly The Economist contains a revealing anecdote about Vice President Joe Biden – revealing not merely about Biden himself but about economics, politics and their interaction.

The anecdote is recounted by one of the magazine’s American correspondents, whose byline is “Lexington.” The column identifies Biden as chief mediator between the Obama administration and the Republican opposition. Lexington finds Biden suited to that task, citing his 40-year Congressional career mostly spent brokering deals and schmoozing colleagues. It is not Biden’s fault that “America’s problems are larger than the deals that a vice-president can cut.” It seems that, according to Lexington, “small-government conservatives – backed by the Tea Party and allies on the airwaves and online – have raised the political costs of dispensing political pork and favours.”

Since it is not clear why this is a bad thing, it would seem that The Economist’s left-wing bias is showing. This is confirmed when Lexington cites “an old Senate belief cherished by Mr. Biden: that fellow politicians may be wrong but are rarely bad. Mr. Biden likes to recall his shock as an angry young senator on learning that a seemingly heartless Republican foe of disability rights, Jessie Helms, had adopted a disabled orphan.” Lexington’s point is that this experience chastened Biden and made him tolerant of Republicans, willing to oppose their policies but not to question their motives.

Lexington is wrong on both counts. Biden is bigoted, not tolerant. The episode reveals his intolerance of the right wing. But that is the least of its importance.

Helping the Disabled

Even as the current Economist was hitting the newsstands, the tolerant, conciliatory Mr. Biden was floating proposals for his boss to suspend the Second Amendment rights of Americans via executive order. In so doing, Biden was displaying the same callous insensitivity he displayed toward Jesse Helms in assuming that Helms’ opposition to federal disability “rights” legislation reflected a persona animus toward the disabled as a class.

Today, thanks to research by Arthur Brooks of the American Enterprise Institute, we know that right-wingers like Jesse Helms provide the bulk of charitable assistance in America. Left-wingers tend to consider their tax payments as their contribution to charity. We also know that federal-government welfare programs have become a monstrosity, mushrooming in number and size while failing to make a dent in the problems they were ostensibly intended to solve. The latter conclusion is now shared by many on the left as well as practically everybody else.

The notion that opposition to big-government is “heartless” implies that compassion is expressed impersonally, indirectly and ruthlessly by taking money from some people and giving it to others, rather than personally and directly by immediately benefitting those who need help. This not only prejudges the motives of the opponent, it takes for granted both the good will and the efficiency of the government. In other words, it was not only bigoted but dumb.

Biden’s opposition to Helms was simply the reflexive action of a man not given to reflective thought. His numerous verbal gaffes committed while Vice President reinforce this interpretation. Biden’s status as the Obama administration’s designated dealmaker does not bespeak any innate sense of empathy for his opposite numbers across the aisle, any more than a used-car dealer need feel kinship with his customers.

Jesse Helms vs. Joe Biden

Lexington’s anecdote has much more revealing economic implications. Contrast the two types of problem-solving approach illustrated. On the one hand, there is the “Jesse Helms” approach. Orphans are in trouble. They need help. Helms sees them. He responds immediately and directly – by helping orphans.

Now compare this with the “Joe Biden” approach. He sees orphans in trouble. He responds by – well, he “responds” by setting in motion a lengthy, ponderous, indirect process that just may, if all goes well, after many months or even several years elapse, succeed in helping some orphans, to some vague and indeterminate degree.

Is this comparison unduly pejorative? Does it prejudice the case against the Biden approach? No, this would seem to be a pretty dispassionate summation of the history of federal-government welfare programs over the last five decades, when balanced against the efforts of the private sector. The Congressional legislative process is indeed protracted, beginning with bill introduction, committee study and submission to the full chamber, followed by reconciliation and eventual passage by both houses. This alone often takes up the better part of one legislative session. Sometimes bills are held over into the next session; sometimes they linger on for years.

When the aid-to-orphans bill passes, does that mean the problem is solved? Certainly not. It means that government machinery is formally set up. It may take months or even years for the resulting program to become operational. After it does, the program may operate indirectly through pre-existing state and/or local programs. The federal program may generate related programs, exhibiting a form of political cellular mitosis.

The programs themselves are intended to help orphans, but they do not provide the form of direct help that Jesse Helms provided. That is, they do not take in orphans and provide them with those things the lack of which makes them orphans in the first place; namely, a loving, caring, compassionate home and family. They may provide institutional shelter in the form of a state-run home. They may provide real income, mostly in the form of in-kind assistance. This second-best form of care will be dispensed by bureaucrats and tied to all kinds of strings and rules. These rules are ostensibly designed to insure that the taxpayer funds bankrolling the program are wisely spent. But the result of this bureaucracy is invariably a system that works poorly and is disliked by the social workers who administer it, the recipients of its largesse and the taxpayers who fund it.

Ah, but surely private charity comes with its own constraints, its own delays, its own bureaucratic drawbacks and roadblocks? For example, Jesse Helms almost surely had to undergo a suitability test in order to adopt; running that gauntlet took time and effort. True enough, but the example of Father Flanagan and Boys’ Town in Omaha, Nebraska shines a glaring light of contrast on the difference between government welfare and private charity. Starting with nothing but a handful of homeless and impoverished boys and his own determination, Father Flanagan built Boys’ Town into a self-sufficient city of self-governing boys that has attracted orphans like a magnet for nearly a century.

It is true that the sunk costs of enabling legislation and setting up programs have already been expended; the welfare system is already in place. But instead of time take to pass new laws, we have to factor in time and expense of re-authorizing and financing programs already in place. Indeed, the crisis posed by public debt alone is reason enough to abandon the fiction of the “compassionate” Biden and the “heartless” Helms. It is not only that the Helms approach works and the Biden approach fails. The Biden approach is drowning representative government in a sea of debt throughout the world.

Roundabout Production

Even if we stipulate that the “Biden approach” has failed dismally in this particular case, can we say that this is a general result? That is, should we apply this lesson not merely to welfare programs but in all situations involving private vs. public assistance? And does it have even broader applicability?

“Helms vs. Biden” illustrates a lesson in the economic theory of production. To drive home the lesson in general terms, consider the example of fishing – a productive activity man has undertaken throughout recorded history. The most primitive production process is also the most direct: wading into the water and catching fish with bare hands. This requires skill and patience as well as access to shallow water holding fish.

A somewhat more productive process involves building a net, which improves the catch-per-unit-of-time. The first net builders had to take time off from fishing or hunting, which required them to build up a store of food to support themselves while net building. In turn, this required reducing their food intake for awhile prior to the investment period. This was an early historical example of the economic process of saving (dietary stricture and food stockpiling) and investment (net building).

More productive still is to construct rod and line to supplement the net. Yet more productive is to build a boat to enlarge the geographic range of fishing. These broaden the time frame of the production process considerably since they require much more time spent on investment and fishing itself. But the huge improvement in physical productivity in terms of potential catch makes the time spent worthwhile.

In the last half-century, fishing has become a production activity analogous to farming. Businesses have purchased infant fish and/or breeding stock and ponds, lakes or defined oceanic territory in which to raise colonies of fish for commercial harvesting. Obviously, this is the most protracted and costly of all fishing production processes, as well as potentially the most productive and lucrative.

The economic term of art that describes this continuum of production processes is “roundaboutness.” The most direct production processes are those that translate inputs into consumption output the quickest. Successively less direct processes take more and more time and involve more and more steps, but tend to gain more productivity with each increase in time and stages. The great Austrian economist of the late 19th and early 20th century, Eugen von Bohm Bawerk, described this by saying that roundabout production processes tend to be more productive.

Bohm Bawerk also found roundabout processes to be more characteristic of capitalism. Owners of capital (the machines and goods-in-process vital to the productivity of longer processes) can borrow to finance their own investment in these longer processes. They pay workers the discounted value of their marginal product for the work they do and use the premium above the discount to repay the borrowing. Thus, everybody can benefit from the enhanced productivity of roundabout production. Interest rates are reflected in the borrowing and in the discounting process that produces the premium.

Capitalism comes into the discussion because roundaboutness cannot be properly evaluated without the existence of prices and interest rates. It is tempting to view the productivity of roundabout production as an immutable physical law, but sometimes the good being produced is a service that has no physical yield. Now we have no alternative except to evaluate that yield in monetary terms using its price as a multiplicand. Even more compelling is the fact that a larger quantity of physical output in the future is not necessarily preferable to a smaller quantity today; it depends on the time preferences of individuals and their rate of preference for consumption today versus consumption in the future. A sufficiently high rate of preference for consumption today could override the possibility of more output in the future and tip the balance in favor of the simplest and most direct production process rather than a more roundabout one.

Another factor that might argue against roundabout processes is scarcity of inputs used in those processes. Thus, input prices have to figure in the evaluation, too. And interest rates reflect the intensity of consumer time preferences as well as the scarcity of funds made available by savers for investment purposes. Thus, interest rates are key to the calculation of costs and benefits for roundabout processes.

In a pure capitalist economy, roundabout processes are used only when they are profitable. That is the same as saying that they are used only when the value created by their higher productivity exceeds the value lost to their higher investment cost. Thus, under capitalism we are doubly blessed. As consumers, we benefit from the ofttimes greater productivity of roundabout production without having it jammed down our throats when it is not beneficial on net balance. The safety factor is the presence of the profit motive. When roundabout production is too costly, it will be unprofitable and firm owners and managers will veto it.

Government and Roundabout Production

Government is roundabout production to the max. The very existence of the legislative process itself gets government started in a roundabout direction. Stages of production increase every time a new level of bureaucracy is created. The difficulty of interacting with bureaucrats and repeating budget authorization procedures annually maintains and even increases the temporal distance between the consumer and the good or service being provided by government.

Unlike production in a pure capitalist economy, however, government production possesses no inherent internal check on roundabout processes. There is no profit motive; thus, there is no easy way to tell how much recipients like the service being provided. The absence of profit means that there is no check on costs incurred; indeed, the value of government services is traditionally gauged according to the value of the inputs used in providing them! In other words, the more we spend on government, the better off we are supposed to be. The polite way of describing this state of affairs is to say that the incentives are perverse.

Nobody has any reason to spend money carefully since bureaucrats are rewarded by overspending their budgets (with bigger budgets and larger departments) and for increasing the size of their departments (with promotions, larger salaries and more impressive titles). Government employees are the inputs into the roundabout production of government services; those production costs are income to them. Thus, the higher costs soar, the better they like it – no matter how economically inefficient this might be. True, government employees pay taxes, too, but they pay only a tiny fraction of the costs of their services while reaping all the wage, salary and fringe benefits.

To make matters worse, the demand side of the market is least amenable to roundabout production for goods and services provided by government. Welfare payments, disaster relief, military goods and services, “social insurance” and medical care for the aged and impecunious are things typically desired with the highest degree of immediate urgency. That is, they are areas where time preference is presumed to be very high and the wish for current consumption is at its greatest. Thus, even where productivity gains from roundabout production might be available, it is by no means likely that recipients of government aid would consider those gains to be “worth the wait” in the economic sense. Judging from the high level of dissatisfaction commonly expressed with government production, it is probable that neither consumers of government nor taxpayers are getting their money’s worth.

In summary, then, roundabout production has proven to be an economic triumph in free capitalist markets, where it has spurred tremendous improvements in productive techniques and living standards. And it has proven disastrous when used by government to produce goods and services. The difference between the two outcomes is the presence of the profit motive under free markets and its absence in government.

Why Has “Biden” Triumphed Over “Helms”?

Over time, various rationales have been advanced for the “Biden approach” and against the “Helms approach.” Originally, the “Helms approach” was seen as a “do-nothing” approach. The presumption – sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit – was that unless government adopted its roundabout approach, nothing would be done to help the poor, sick, orphaned, old, infirm, stricken, et al. We know now that this is not true and was never true. Even in past centuries, much voluntary effort was expended to help those in need. The reasons why this effort looks skimpy to modern eyes is twofold. First, real incomes in general were much lower and less was available for every purpose – charity included. Second, much activity was carried out informally within the boundaries of the family, neighborhoods and churches, without ever being recorded. Today, the omnipresence and scope of government has diminished the importance of the family and reduced the importance of the voluntary private sector.

The problem with the “do-nothing” presumption is that it contradicts the other premises of the welfare state. Much is made of the fact that we “voluntarily tax ourselves” to enable government to undertake its work. Of course, if this were really true, taxation would be superfluous and wasteful. The purpose of taxation is to coerce the unwilling; they are being taxed, not those who voluntarily surrender their income to the state. If people are unwilling, they presumably have a good reason. Either way, there is no reason to preserve a status quo that has broken down. Let the willing contribute to charities of their choice. This gesture will undoubtedly recruit many who are now unwilling to allow government to waste their money but would willingly give money if allowed to supervise, evaluate and find-tune their contributions.

Of course, somebody must be lobbying strongly in favor of the current system. It is the administrators, managers and employees of the 180 or so federal agencies that make up the welfare system. Welfare started out as an ostensible benefit for the poor but has now become a kind of dole for those who operate the system rather than its supposed beneficiaries. Most of these people earn higher salaries and larger employment benefits than they would otherwise earn in the private sector. Thus, they have a very strong motivation to preserve the status quo even though they are themselves taxpayers.

There is one more group – a small one – whose self-interest is identified strongly with the “Joe Biden approach.” That is the relatively small number of politicians who gain a large number of votes from their staunch of this system. And it is this group whose resistance to change has kept that system in place.

Meanwhile, what of the orphans themselves, disabled or otherwise? In a voluntary society, they could choose where to seek assistance just as the rest of us could choose whether and how to render it. The problem would be getting those who need help together with those willing and able to help. Today, the one thing available to all in profusion is information. It is impossible to believe that the voluntary efforts of a free people would accomplish less than the self-interested efforts of a badly motivated, poorly informed government.

That is the crowning irony of “Biden vs. Helms;” the Helms approach empowers the poor while the Biden approach renders them relatively powerless. The best way to help orphans is to keep government away from them.

DRI-179 for week of 12-23-12: Shoot the Shooter

An Access Advertising EconBrief:

Shoot the Shooter

By this time, few if any Americans can be unaware of the slaughter of 20 elementary schoolchildren and 6 teachers and administrators at the Sandy Hook elementary school in Newtown, CT, on Dec. 15. The perpetrator, 20-year-old Adam Lanza, used a semi-automatic rifle belonging to his mother, whom he killed first of all. The shootings have maintained a stranglehold on the attention of the news media since they occurred, fending off even the “fiscal cliff” for primacy.

The news media, mainstream politicians and the left wing reacted to this horrific act with utter predictability. They all blamed the physical instrument used to commit the crime – a gun – for the purposive acts of the perpetrator. Calls went out for heightened gun control. The word “heightened” is apropos because guns are already the most heavily regulated consumer purchase in America.

The apogee of this predictable reaction was reached with a call by President Barack Obama for legislation to be recommended by a committee headed by Vice-President Joe Biden. The legislation would purportedly be directed at “gun violence,” but this is widely understood as a euphemism for gun control; e.g., further restrictions on the possession, purchase and use of guns.

This is the latest in a string of mass shootings, each of which has received lavish publicity, triggering (no pun intended) similar calls for regulatory screw-tightening. There is a rapidly forming consensus that “this time is different.” The reasons for the difference vary from cumulative disgust (“Enough is enough,” proclaimed President Obama in heralding the formation of his commission) to the ostensible escalation of horror resulting from the murder of children.

This space thoroughly analyzed the last mass shooting (in an Aurora, CO cinema premiering the latest installment in the Batman franchise) and provided the logical response. Not surprisingly, that response was thoroughly ignored – although the evidence has continued to mount in its favor. Now, with the Second Amendment rights of Americans and their very safety at risk as never before, those arguments are well worth rehearsing.

The Problems

There are three problems associated with mass shootings of the Newtown type. Listed in descending order of importance, they are:

The problem of dealing with the shooter. The overarching problem is the fact that a group of people is faced by an armed man intent on killing as many of them as possible – or at least killing until his need or desire to kill has been satiated. The immediate imperative is an emergency of the highest order: to stop the killing as quickly and completely as possible.

The problem of deterring further shootings. Once the killing has been stopped, the highest remaining need in the hierarchy of urgency can be addressed. That is the need to deter further shootings of this type. In criminal justice generally, deterrence is accomplished by apprehension and punishment. Mass shootings present a unique and anomalous case. Apprehension is not a problem because the shooter continues to shoot until interrupted by the arrival of the police and then either commits suicide or (rarely) surrenders. Punishment does not deter because the shooter is obviously fully prepared to die at the scene or, failing that, following conviction. The shooter is someone for whom life holds no further attraction and meaning is reduced to taking random vengeance for the perceived slights he has suffered. Thus the problem of deterrence appears in a peculiar and unique guise.

The problem of uncovering the “root cause” of the shootings; e.g., of discovering the precise motive that constitutes the perception of injury and source of homicidal rage. The ostensible presumption is that this discovery will unlock the door to deterring further shootings.

Mainstream media attention has focused on these problems in inverse order of their actual importance. From the first media reports – long before any of the details of the crime were accurately relayed – the obsessive focus has puzzled over the shooter’s motive. Of course, motive plays a key role in a typical murder investigation, but that is because the murderer’s identity is usually unknown or in dispute. Motive, means and opportunity form the triad of elements necessary to secure a criminal conviction under those circumstances.

That is all too obviously not true here. The shooter is known. Even in the unlikely event of a trial, even given the proverbial difficulty of actually proving simple guilt in a capital case, the issue of motive is surely peripheral to guilt or innocence because the physical circumstances are utterly damning.

If we don’t need to know the shooter’s motive to convict him, why does motive matter? The vague presumption is that if we only knew what makes people do these things, we could prevent them – somehow, some way. That explains the repeated references to “mental illness” as a common denominator among shooters and the blaming of the de-institutionalization policies adopted in the 1970s for allowing time-bomb killers to roam the streets.

“Mental Illness” as Scapegoat

Unfortunately, the mental illness paradigm is doubly disappointing as an answer to the problem of mass shootings. It can neither satisfactorily explain their incidence nor offer the key to deterrence. The term “mental illness” is a throwback to the days of Freudian psychology, before neuroscience came along. The days of belief in “diseases” of the unconscious mind, analogous to diseases of the body but treatable via psychotherapy rather than medicine, are blessedly behind us. What we once called mental illness has gradually revealed itself largely as aberrant brain chemistry, treatable with drugs. Psychiatrists have traded in their couches for a pharmacopeia. Cultural lag has restrained public recognition of the fact that “mental illness” is an obsolete term.

Despite the claims of institutionalization proponents like Dr. E. Fuller Torrey, however, we cannot confidently sort out potentially violent sufferers of (say) bi-polar disorder, let alone distinguish dangerous psychotics from harmless ones. The traditional legal definition of insanity has long been the inability to distinguish right from wrong, but there is little or no reason to believe that today’s mass shooters are insane in this sense, although they may well be mentally ill in the physical sense.

Institutionalization of the mentally ill fell from favor for the very good reason that the practice was routinely and grossly abused. The protections against seizure and detention that all of us take for granted were suspended on supposed medical grounds that we now know to have been all too often spurious. State mental institutions were not always the hellholes depicted in the 1948 movie The Snake Pit, but the shoe fit well enough to touch off a nationwide furor and set events in motion that culminated in the 1970s.

Now that the pendulum of political theater has swung back to focus on mass shootings, the political establishment has whistled up a dragnet for scapegoats and the mentally ill are easy pickings. How many votes do they command, after all? It is much more politically correct to come out as homosexual than as mentally ill. While it may be easy to pretend to solve the problem of mass shootings by stigmatizing a vague class of people that are hard to identify, actually getting results that way is a different story.

The attempt to use mental illness as a scapegoat for mass shootings is really a variant of the old left-wing “root cause” approach to criminology. For decades, garden-variety criminality was excused as the product of sociological deprivation. The only way to fight crime, the left insisted, was to abolish poverty by fighting a “war on poverty.” That war was lost long ago when we discovered that fighting it benefitted the fighters more than the poor and that poverty was a relative, not an absolute, phenomenon. Ironically, the only viable “root-cause” solution is one we refuse to adopt; namely, drug legalization.

The Real Solution

As originally noted in our first discussion of this problem, the most urgent item of business is to neutralize the shooter. The following thought experiment is instructive: Assume that an experienced policeman happens to be on the scene of a mass shooting. What would he do when the shooter produced one or more weapons and opened fire? The answer is blindingly obvious.

He would draw his weapon – policemen are required to carry one even when off duty – and shoot the shooter. There is only one way to handle an armed perpetrator bent on immediate and indiscriminate homicide – by shooting him. The policeman would not try to negotiate with the shooter. He would not call for backup, call for a SWAT team or call for Phillip Morris. And his shots would have only one objective: to kill the shooter. A wounded armed opponent can still kill you and other people in the vicinity.

The crystal clarity of this insight contrasts jarringly with the public refusal of most people – particularly politicians and journalists – to face it. When Wayne LaPierre, President of the National Rifle Association, declared that “the only thing that can stop a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun,” his call to station a policeman in schools was met with derision. A typical reaction from academia was that return fire from police would increase risk by increasing the number and sources of fired bullets that might injure students.

That a response so staggeringly inept could originate with an educator – ostensibly a font of wisdom and reasoned thought – speaks volumes about the degradation of education in general and current public discourse in particular. Failure to shoot the shooter will (as it has in every case to date) allow him to kill his fill of innocent citizens until the police arrive. Return fire, even if ineffectual, will draw the shooter’s attention and shots toward the retaliator and away from the audience, allowing the unarmed to escape.

Another inane argument advanced against retaliating fire is that mass shooters now often sport so-called bullet-proof vests. This is not only true but also quite significant, since it shows that shooters are not too deracinated to carefully plot their crime and anticipate opposition. But the use of (say) a Kevlar vest is no reason not to shoot the shooter. First and foremost, a vest does not protect the shooter’s vulnerable head and neck. Equally telling, a vest-wearing shooter does not continue his work unperturbed like Superman while bullets bounce off his vest harmlessly. A bullet-proof vest is designed to prevent a mortal wound, not to completely overcome all effects of a fired bullet. The impact of a slug from a large-caliber handgun will probably knock down and badly bruise a vest-wearing human target. At the very least, it will allow an audience time to escape and a retaliator time and opportunity to finish him off. (Vest-wearing police normally conduct firefights in pairs or teams and rely on their colleagues for protection when struck.)

The Anti-gun Movement: Cynicism and Hysteria

The foregoing arguments are a sample of how the left wing wages its current fight to control guns. (The word “debate” does not apply to these exchanges since the left wing proffers neither logic nor empirical evidence and makes its points by shouting down the opposition.) The left runs the gamut of emotional reaction from cynicism to hysteria.

President Obama’s reaction to the shooting was political cynicism in its purest (or impurest) form. “Enough is enough,” he intoned solemnly. The nation could no longer afford to indulge the freedoms traditionally accorded gun owners. But enough only became enough after the President’s reelection, not after the previous mass shooting in the Aurora, CO movie theater in July, 2012. Had some sort of cumulative numerical threshold for mass murder been surpassed?

No, the hurdle presented by the President’s reelection had been surpassed; that was the difference in the two situations. Now the President could apply his trusty rule-of-thumb: Never let a crisis go to waste. The President’s black constituency is a dedicated group of gun-bearers. Prior to reelection he could hardly have risked incurring their wrath by threatening their rights and property. Now, with 94% of their votes safely recorded and his tenure secured, he can go back to ignoring their welfare in favor of the hard-left agenda of gun proscription and confiscation.

At the other emotional pole is the hysterical fringe. Their poster boy is British-born Piers Morgan, host of CNN Tonight. His notion of hospitality to guest Larry Pratt, longtime Second Amendment defender and gun educator, was to hurl imprecations at him. Morgan called Pratt an “idiot,” “dangerous” and “an unbelievably stupid man” – all within the space of less than a minute. Later, Morgan asked rhetorically “how many more kids have to die before” more restrictive gun laws are passed.

The reaction to Morgan’s tantrum is instructive. To date, over 70,000 signatories have urged his deportation (!) in an online petition posted to a White House website. The episode is a classic illustration of what F.A. Hayek called absolute or unlimited democracy at work. Opposing sides expend vast quantities of resources to gain political power which, when attained, they then use to deprive the other side of its rights. The left tries to deprive the right of the right to self-defense; the right tries to deprive the left of freedom of movement.

Readers of the world-famous British weekly The Economist know how Morgan came by his arrogant tunnel vision. The magazine noted that mass shootings in Great Britain and Tasmania in 1996 led directly to a ban of most private handgun ownership in Great Britain and a ban on most semi-automatic weapons in Australia. “If similar laws had been in effect in Sandy Hook,” the magazine piously declared, “some of those lost might have survived.” In fact, England’s gun ban was followed by an epidemic of gun-related violence. Handgun crime doubled and English police began carrying guns for the first time. In Australia, assaults – particularly sexual assaults – went up dramatically following the bans, while homicides continued a modest decline that started prior to the ban.

A once-great magazine has sunk to unimagined depths of demagoguery and incompetence. Bad enough to have refused to face the truth of a single historical example, but The Economist has turned its eyes away from 25 years of pathbreaking social and economic research spanning the globe.

Guns are the Answer, not the Problem

The left-wing movement for gun control was sparked by the political assassinations of the 1960s and turbo-charged by the attempted assassination of President Reagan and his press secretary in 1981. Serious research into the incidence of gun ownership and violence followed later in that decade. Gary Kleck, a liberal academic at FloridaStateUniversity, began with the general expectation of documenting the case for gun control. To his great surprise, he found that cases of gun use for self-defense and protection vastly outnumbered cases of criminal use – by a factor of six in 1993, according to his estimates based on a household survey of 5000. Economist John Lott did extensive research on the extension of rights to carry and conceal firearms, finding that rates of violent crimes in general and murder in particular declined when and where these rights were granted. David Kopel was another researcher whose work in this field has been widely noted and cited. The field of research eventually broadened to include worldwide study of violence and mass killings. The latter are not, as often claimed, unique to the United States. They are a trans-national and cross-cultural global phenomenon, perpetrated with and without guns.

As one would expect, critics (i.e., the left wing) did everything but dismember these men in order to discredit them. But those efforts failed, because all Kleck, Lott, Kopel, et al were doing was empirically bolstering a case that was already logically airtight. Even if recorded instances of handgun defensive use were actually outnumbered by numbers of crimes committed using handguns, this doesn’t even start to make a case for gun control, let alone a gun ban. We can never record all the cases in which citizens interrupt a crime in progress by brandishing a handgun. We can never even begin to imagine all the times in which criminals are deterred from crime by the knowledge or the suspicion that the potential victim is armed. It is no accident that mass shootings occur in so-called “gun-free” settings, where guns are available only to criminals, not law-abiding citizens in need of defense.

Gun control and gun bans do virtually no good at all, only bad. They do nothing to prevent mass shootings or, indeed, crime of any kind. Criminals do not obey laws – including gun laws. Ordinary criminals prefer to work with guns whose identifying marks have been erased; these are available in the black market. Black markets in beverage alcohol and recreational drugs developed quickly and massively in response to the combination of widespread demand and official proscription. Minutes after restrictive gun laws or gun bans were officially put on the books, black markets in guns would spring up.

It is both ironic and fitting that the left-wing solution is especially inappropriate in the case of mass shootings. Adam Lanza obtained his weapons illegally. Like other mass shooters, he had access to wealth that he could and would have used to acquire guns in the black market had they been illegal. Mass shooters are the last people in the world to be deterred by the high price and inconvenience of black-market transactions; after all, they are preparing to leave this world. They face only one possible deterrent – the possibility that they cannot execute their plan to kill large numbers of people. The only roadblock to that plan is the presence on site of somebody with a gun to shoot them.

Economists use two Latin phrases that explain the fallacy under which gun controllers operate. Gun bans implicitly assume a condition of ceteris paribus (“all other things the same or unchanged”); the left believes that they can ban guns without causing huge behavioral responses by the public. But economic reality follows the principle of mutatis mutandis (“let those things change that will change”); behavioral changes will accompany severe gun restrictions. Those changes will create black markets that will neutralize the effects of the gun restrictions and wreak havoc on our lives. Criminals will have guns but law-abiding citizens will not have them for self-defense. So, law-abiding citizens will have to become criminals in order to protect themselves.

It would be bad enough if gun control and gun bans were only ineffectual, if the left wing were guilty only of good intentions gone wrong. But the truth is much worse. It indicts the left of exactly the crime of which they accuse gun owners and the NRA – indifference to the fate of innocent children and adults. Guns themselves are the solution – the only solution – to the immediate problem posed by gun-related violence. The police recognize that; in response to the increased firepower utilized by drug cartels, the police have become virtually paramilitary in size, scope and technique.

Police in the Schools?

The proposal put forward by Wayne LaPierre of the NRA is a perfect reflection of the zeitgeist. In these times, the only politically way to oppose a big-government power grab is to respond with a Newtonian equal-and-opposite-reaction – your own big-government counter-proposal. That is what the NRA has done. Presumably they did it for political reasons, because they believe that putting somebody in authority behind the gun will somehow soften or sanctify a reaction that would otherwise be objectionable. Predictably, this did not work. The left wing reacted just as emotionally as if the NRA had proposed installing a Tea-Party-certified marksman in each school. The same left-wing media figures who recoil in horror from armed police in public schools send their own children to private schools like Sidwell Friends, which employ armed guards.

Now the right wing is stuck with its own big-government proposal, made in the heat of panic. The vague notion that each policeman is somehow well-versed in the care and handling of firearms is periodically dispelled when a gaggle of policemen take a dozen shots to dispatch a “dangerous” neighborhood pit bull or expend fifty rounds or so inside a bar or into the body of an unarmed suspect. These days, the real experts on guns are detailed to SWAT, where they are much too valuable on drug patrol to be wasted as public-school monitors.

The likely government alternative to the police would be the HSA, another unlikely source of genuine protection. Retired military veterans are the only source of actual expertise in weapons and combat who might be available for this duty. As one might expect, the best way to handle the problem of mass shootings in schools is to stop the government from getting involved.

But stopping the government from getting involved in something – anything – has now become just about the most difficult thing in the world to do.