DRI-161 for week of 11-30-14: The Enemy Within: The Move to Strangle Welfare-State Reform In Its Crib

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The Enemy Within: The Move to Strangle Welfare-State Reform In Its Crib

The resurgence of the Republican Party after the overwhelming victory of Barack Obama and the Democrats in the 2008 elections was led by the Tea Party. This grassroots political movement began as a popular uprising and only gradually acquired formal organizational trappings. As yet, its ideological roots are so thin and shallow that they provide no support for the movement.

This contrasts sharply with the conservative movement, in which the order of development was reversed. Ideology came first, with roots implanted firmly by opposition to the New Deal and a foreign policy led by Sen. Robert Taft. The intellectual foundation laid by William F. Buckley, Jr. in National Review Magazine educated a generation of young Republicans and paved the way for the candidacy of Barry Goldwater in 1964. Goldwater’s landslide defeat nevertheless introduced Ronald Reagan to national politics. By the time Reagan became President in 1980, conservatism had become the dominant political paradigm.

Nowhere is a vacuum more abhorrent than in political ideology. Today’s victorious Republicans may purport to search for a mode of governance, but what they are really doing is belatedly deciding what they stand for. (The hapless domestic and foreign policies of the Obama administration gave them the luxury of winning the elections merely by signaling their lack of congruence with President Obama et al.) They enjoy a surfeit of advice from all quarters.

Nowhere is this advice more pointed than in its economic dimension.

 

Should Republicans “Take ‘Yes’ For an Answer?”

 

Although Buckley died in 2006, National Review still retains some of the intellectual momentum he generated. Its “Roving Correspondent,” Kevin Williamson, devoted a recent essay to an advisory for the Republican Party on post-victory strategy. Williamson sees the solid victory in the 2014 mid-term elections as “a chance to meet voters where they are.” To do that, Republicans need to “take ‘yes’ for an answer.”

Exactly how should we interpret these glib formulations? Williamson insists that Republicans should not treat electoral good fortune as the opportunity to create change. Instead, the Party should reverse the normal order of precedence and cater to popular disposition – “meet the voters where they are” instead of persuading the voters of the desirability or necessity of change. Don’t continue the campaign, Williamson pleads. The votes have already been counted; just “take ‘yes’ for an answer” and get on with the business of crafting a governing compromise that everybody can live with.

So much for the revolutionary stance of the Tea Party; the EPA won’t have to test BostonHarbor for caffeine contamination.

The reader’s instinctive reaction to Williamson’s essay is to flip the magazine over and re-check the cover. Can this really be National Review, legendary incubator of conservative thought, renowned for taking no prisoners in the ideological wars? We have just suffered six years under the lash of a Democrat regime whose marching order was “elections have consequences.” Now the flagship of American conservatism is preaching a gospel of preemptive surrender?

Williamson’s mood is apparently the product of disillusionment. The birth of NR, he reminds his readers, was a reaction to Eisenhower Republicanism. Instead of rolling back the welfare state installed by Roosevelt and Truman, Ike accepted it – thereby setting the tone for Republican policy thereafter. The magazine fulminated, but to no avail. Goldwaterism produced Reagan… “a self-described New Deal Democrat,” pouts Williamson, “who famously proclaimed that he hadn’t left eh Democratic Party but the party had left him.”

Reagan revisionism is part of a new NR realpolitik, it seems. “At the end of the Reagan years, the Soviet Union was dead on its feet, the United States was a resurgent force in the world… and spending and deficits both were up, thanks to the White House’s inability or unwillingness to put a leash on Tip O’Neill and congressional Democrats. The public sector was larger and more arrogant, there were more rather than fewer bureaucrats and bureaucracies, and nobody had made so much as a head fake in the direction of reforming such New Deal legacies as Social Security or even Great Society boondoggles such as Medicaid.”

The author’s psychological defeatism apparently so overwhelmed him that he lost touch with reality. The Soviet Union is “dead on its feet” but the singular responsibility of President Ronald Reagan for this fact is unmentioned. (One cannot help wondering whether this is an oversight or a deliberate omission.) But Reagan is held liable for the actions of the Democrat Speaker of the House and Congressional Democrats! Has anybody blamed Barack Obama for not “putting a leash on House Republicans” to achieve more of his agenda? Has Williamson published his Canine Theory of Congressional Fiscal Restraint in a peer-reviewed journal of political science?

One might have thought that winning the Cold War, taming hyperinflation and reviving moribund economic growth (also left unmentioned by Williamson) constituted sufficient labor unto a Presidential tenure. Various authors, ranging from Paul Craig Roberts to David Stockman, have chronicled the internecine warfare attending the Reagan administration’s efforts to cut the federal budget. Apparently Williamson has forgotten, if he ever knew, that Reagan enjoyed the reputation of a ferocious budget-cutter while in office. This dovetailed with his famous declaration that “government isn’t the solution – it’s the problem.” If, three decades after the fact, Reagan’s efforts seem puny, this may be because we hold him responsible for failing to effect a counterrevolution to match the permanency of FDR’s New Deal. One would think, though, that the only President since FDR to actually reduce the size of the Federal Register deserved better at Williamson’s hands.

Obviously, Williamson paints a false portrait of the Reagan years to justify the counsel of despair he gives today. “We did not undo the New Deal in the 1980s. We are not going to undo the New Deal before 2017 either… the fact remains that the American people are not as conservative as conservatives would like them to be, nor are they always conservative in the way conservatives would like them to be.” It seems that there is a “disconnect between the numbers of Americans who describe themselves as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ and the policy preferences those Americans express.” Americans think of themselves as conservative but favor liberal policies. So, Williamson concludes, the only sensible thing to do is humor them.

“Americans …are, by and large, conservative in the same sense that Ronald Reagan was, not in the sense that Robert Taft was, or… Barry Goldwater was. They intuit that the federal government is overly large and intrusive, they resent the slackers and idlers who exploit that situation, and they worry that our long-term finances are upside down, but they do not wish to repeal the New Deal.”

“Example: A majority of voters believe that something must be done to rectify Social Security’s finances, and a plurality of voters believe that a combination of benefit cuts and tax increases should be adopted to achieve that… [but] strong majorities … of 56 percent… oppose Social Security benefit cuts and Social Security tax increases, according to Gallup. No doubt many of these voters think of themselves as conservatives… it is likely that the great majority of self-described conservatives would support continuing current Social Security policies indefinitely – if they believed it fiscally possible. The current Left-Right divide on Social Security is not a question of what we ought to do, but of what we can do.” Williamson cites Robert Taft’s eventual concession on Social Security as an example of the Right bending its principles to his form of pragmatism. After all, “populist measures are, to the surprise of nobody except scholars of political science, popular, hence the support among a majority of registered Republicans for raising the minimum wage.”

Instead of fighting among themselves on principle, Williamson contends, Republicans should be scanning the polls to find out where their base stands – and adjusting their stance accordingly. They should be meeting the voters where the voters are rather than persuading voters to see the light of sweet reason. They should take “yes” for an answer when they hear it from the networks on election night.

Rebutting Williamson’s “Populism”

 

No full-blooded Tea Party member will swallow Kevin Williamson’s argument, despite the author’s insistence that he is really enunciating their position. They didn’t overcome the twin obstacles of the Democrat Party and the Republican establishment only to be lectured on their extremism in the pages of National Review, for crying out loud. But we must go beyond visceral rejection of Williamson’s moral and psychological defeatism. Straightforward analysis indicts it.

Since the venue is National Review, it is fitting to recall Bill Buckley’s distinction between politics and economics: “The politician says: ‘What do you want? The economist says: What do you want the most?'” For many decades, voters have been offered big government as if it were a consumer product with zero price. That is the context in which to contemplate the poll responses that Williamson treats as commandments graven in stone. In the beginning, there was the word. And conservatives believed the word. But when the world around them changed and God neither smote the unbeliever nor struck down the evil Antichrist, conservatives eventually shrugged and went with the flow. After a while they began singing the same hymns to Baal as the liberals. They couldn’t very well go to jail for non-participation in the Social Security system and they discovered that the government checks always cashed – so why not go along? It was the only way they could get their money out.

In due course, conservatives found out along with the rest of society that they had been lied to and flimflammed by the pay-as-you-go status of Social Security. It was not a system of insurance, after all; the word “social” in the terms “social insurance” and “Social Security” should be taken to mean “not,” just as it does in terms like “social justice,” “social democracy” and “social responsibility.” By then, though, everybody was so thoroughly habituated to the system that it would have required something close to a revolution to change it. Something like what the colonists originally did when they revolted against the British and dumped tea in Boston harbor, for example.

When Williamson implies that conservatives are entirely comfortable with Social Security today, he is being disingenuous. (That either means “lacking in candor” or “naïve;” he is either lying to us or he is plain stupid.) In fact, conservatives (and just about everybody else) below the age of 50 no longer expect even to receive Social Security benefits – they expect the system to go bankrupt long before they collect. They are not comfortable with the system but resigned to it; there is a world of difference between the two. And considering that Williamson himself just published an article on “Generation Vexed” and its growing dissatisfaction with the Obama regime in the previous issue of NR, he cannot claim indifference to their electoral attitudes in this context.

But this attitude of resignation is wildly optimistic compared to the fiscal reality facing America and the rest of Western industrial society today. The welfare state is collapsing around our ears. Central bankers are in extremis; they are reduced to printing money to finance operations. The Eurozone staggers from crisis to crisis. Japan is now working on its third “lost decade.” Demography is a disaster; birth rates will not bail us out. Worse – they are falling like leaden raindrops, reducing the number of workers paying in per welfare-benefit recipient. The crisis is not in the far-off future but today – if the U.S. had to finance upcoming deficits at normal rates of interest rather than the “zero interest rates” of the last five years, the interest charges alone would eat up most of the federal budget. And the entitlement programs that Williamson views as sacred are now eating up most of that budget.

Williamson acts as if Social Security finance were a Starbucks menu. He treats longstanding conservative doctrine on Social Security as if it were excerpted from fundamentalist Scripture out of Inherit the Wind. But he is no Clarence Drummond; Social Security is exactly the Ponzi scheme that conservatives have always fulminated against. In fact, it is worse, because the Day of Judgment is arriving even sooner than prophesied.

True, it isn’t just Social Security – it’s also Medicare and Medicaid and the welfare system. (Welfare reform didn’t come close to reforming the whole system, just one of the six components of it.) The point is that we have passed the elective stage and have now entered the stage of imminent collapse. In that stage, monetary chaos and an uncertain fate for democracy await.

And what is Williamson’s reaction? When Americans protest, “I can be overdrawn; I still have checks,” Williamson nods, “Right you are.” But we’re not just overdrawn – we’re completely bankrupt.

Under these conditions, what are our choices? Suppose we remain in Obamaville. That will result in collapse. Suppose we go Williamson’s route, a route of picking and choosing a few pieces of low-hanging fruitful reform. That will also result in collapse.

We have nothing to lose and everything to gain by telling voters the truth and opting for revolutionary reform. If they reject us, we will be hung for offering a full-bodied sheep – limited government, free markets and freedom – rather than a bleating lamb of meekly pandering populism.

Popunomics

 

Williamson isn’t just selectively bad on economics – he has renounced economic logic entirely in favor of populist emotion. Take the minimum wage – Williamson’s shining example of popular Populism. The minimum wage is one of three or four most heavily researched measures in economics, having attracted empirical studies consistently since the late 1940s. Until the notorious Card-Krueger study in 1993, these found that the minimum wage adversely affected employment of low-skilled labor. These findings jibed with a priori theory, which predicted that a minimum wage would produce a surplus of labor (unemployment), increase the scope for discrimination by buyers of labor against sellers of labor, reduce the quality of labor and/or jobs, encourage businesses to offer fewer benefits and more part-time jobs and encourage businesses to substitute machinery and high-skilled labor for low-skilled labor. All these effects have been observed in conjunction with the minimum wage since its imposition. Card and Krueger offered no rebuttal to the eloquent testimony of the research record and were notably silent on the theory underpinning their own research result, which purported to find an increase in comparative employment in one state after an increase in the minimum wage. Both the validity of their data and the econometric soundness of their results were later challenged.

Having carefully chosen one of the most economically untenable of all Populist positions on which to “meet voters where they are,” Williamson next ups the ante. From the debased coin of the minimum wage, he turns to the fool’s gold of restrictionist anti-immigrationism. The late Richard Nadler painstakingly showed – and in NR to boot, in 2009’s “Great Immigration Shoot-Out” – that restrictionists were big and consistent electoral losers in Republican primaries and general elections. But Williamson is back at the same old stand, hawking “stronger border controls… mandatory use of E-verify… and like measures” because “voters are solidly on the conservatives’ side on this issue.”

Oh really? Just in time – net immigration has been roughly zero for the last few years. Market forces, not government quotas, control international migration; the quotas merely serve to criminalize violators. Immigration benefits America

on net balance, regardless of its legal dimension. Along with free trade and opposition to the minimum wage, place support of free international migration among the issues upon which economists strongly agree.

Wait a minute – Williamson has gone from supporting brain-dead economics because it is generally popular (the minimum wage) to supporting it because it is popular with NR’s constituency. Just as Buckley had to rescue the Right from the anti-Semitism of the American Mercury and the conspiratorial John Birch Society, we are now faced with the task of rehabilitating the right wing from the crank nativism and restrictionism that has asserted squatter’s rights at National Review. Calling Williamson’s version of expedience Populism gives ideology a bad name. The 19th-century Populism of Pitchfork Ben Tillman, et al, featured cheap money and fashionably bad economics but it was more consistent than Williamson’s proposal.

Borrowing the argot of the digital generation, Williamson is expounding not Populism but rather PLR – the “path of least resistance.” Put your finger to the wind and sense what we can get the voters to sign off on. See how many fundamental principles and how much government money we’ll have to sacrifice to win the next election. Williamson purports to be lecturing us on why Republicans fail – because they are too ideologically scrupulous, insisting on free markets, free trade, open borders, flexible prices, deregulation. But the encroachment of big government and the welfare state proceeded mostly unabated throughout the 20th century despite periods of Republican ascendancy. How could this have happened? Because Republicans were really heeding Williamson’s doctrine all along; PLR ruled, not ideological constancy. Goldwater never led the Republican Party, even when he won the nomination. Reagan was detested by the Party establishment and his philosophy was ditched the minute Air Force One lifted off the runway to return him to California. PLR was always the de facto rule of thumb – and forefinger, ring finger and all other digits. How else could a Party ostensibly supporting limited government have countenanced the transition to unlimited government?

Williamson treats the rise of the Tea Party as America’s version of China’s Cultural Revolution. Whew! We must cease all this senseless bloodletting and wild-eyed revolutionary fervor; return to our senses and settle for what we can get rather than striving for Utopia. Back to normalcy, back to pragmatism and compromise and half-a-loaf … well, maybe a quarter-loaf… or even a slice… hell, maybe even a few crumbs, just so its bread.

It is fitting that Keynesian economics has come home to roost in this time of Quantitative Easing and central-banking hegemony and liquidity everywhere with not a loan to drink. “In the long run, we are all dead” was Keynes’ most famous quip. Well, we can’t live in the short run forever. The procession of short runs eventually produces a long run. And the long run is here.

It’s time to pay up. The voters have given Republicans a gift – the chance to tell the truth and turn the ship around before we reach the falls. PLR is no longer sufficient. It’s time – no, it’s long past time to start doing all the things that Williamson says Republicans can’t do and mustn’t do.

The Anti-Economics Party of the Party of Sound Economics?

 

“The American public is in many ways conservative, but in many ways it is not, and its conservatism often is not the conservatism of Milton Friedman or Phil Gramm but that of somebody who fears the national debt and dreads bureaucracy but rather likes his Social Security check.” The Republican Party’s glory days of the post-World War II period came during the Great Moderation ushered in by the Reagan Presidency, beginning in late 1980 and continuing into the present millennium. This success and victory in the Cold War were the only departures from PLR. This period of prosperity was driven by an economic policy whose positive features were disinflation, sound money, low taxes and low inflation. This is a combination that Keynesian economics finds contradictory and now repudiates utterly. Williamson repudiates it, too, hence his explicit rejection of Milton Friedman and Phil Gramm as exponents of conservatism. (Once again, his use of Friedman, a libertarian rather than a conservative, is disingenuous.) He is still living in the past, the days when we could have our conservatism and our Social Security checks, too. Sorry, we have bigger problems now than how to buy votes from our own voter base to win the next election.

For years, Republicans have been able to win occasional elections the easy way, by adopting PLR. Those days are over. From now on, the Republicans will have to earn their money as a party of limited government by actually practicing the principles they profess. That is the bad news. But the good news is that they cannot lose by doing this. The very economics that Kevin Williamson looks down on tells us that.

Economics defines “cost” as the alternative foregone. If telling the truth will cause you to lose the election, you may well decide to lie; the cost of truth-telling will seem too high. But if winning the election and losing the election are reduced to equivalence by the consequences of economic collapse, then telling the truth suddenly becomes costly no longer. Now avoiding collapse becomes the only matter of consequence and the election outcome fades into insignificance.

Ironically, that is not only sound economics; it is also supremely pragmatic.

DRI-275 for week of 6-1-14: The Triumph of Economics in Sports: Economics Takes the Field to Build Winning Teams

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The Triumph of Economics in Sports: Economics Takes the Field to Build Winning Teams

In the previous two EconBriefs, we spoke of a popular attitude towards sports. It looks nostalgically to a hazy past, when men played a boys’ game with joyous abandon. Today, alas, sports are “just a business,” which is “all about the money.” As elsewhere, “greed” – a mysterious force no more explicable than a plague of locusts – has overtaken the men and robbed them of their childlike innocence.

This emotional theory of human behavior owes nothing to reason. It is the view now commonly bruited by those who describe the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession as the outcome of free markets run rampant. People are irrational, so the result of “unfettered capitalism” must naturally be chaotic disaster.

Economics is the rational theory of human choice. For a half-century, it has opposed the irrationalists from two directions. Its free-market adherents have been led by the Chicago School of Frank Knight, Milton Friedman and George Stigler. That school embraced a theory of perfect rationality: perfect knowledge held by all market participants (later modified somewhat by a theory of information only slightly less heroic in its assumptions), perfectly competitive markets and (where necessary) perfectly benevolent government regulators and/or economist advisors.

The neo-Keynesian opponents of Chicago accepted individual rationality but asserted that individually rational actions produced perverse results in the aggregate, leading to involuntary unemployment and stagnant economies. Only counteracting measures by far-seeing government policymakers and regulators – following the advice of economist philosopher-kings – could rescue us from the depredations of free markets.

The debate, then, has largely been defined by people who saw market participants moved either by utter irrationality or complete rationality. But our analysis has revealed instead an evolutionary climate in which participants in professional sports pursued their own ends rationally within the limits imposed by their own knowledge and capabilities. The great free-market economist F.A. Hayek observed that capitalism does not demand that its practitioners be rational. Instead, the practice of capitalism itself makes people more rational than otherwise by continually providing the incentive to learn, adapt and adopt the most efficient means toward any end. Professional sports has exemplified Hayek’s dictum.

Early on, in its first century, the pursuit of individual self-interest left baseball owners, players and fans at loggerheads. The first owner to address himself to the task of improving the product provided to sports fans was Bill Veeck, Jr., who introduced a host of business, financial and marketing innovations that not only enhanced his own personal wealth but also treated his fans as customers whose patronage was vital. The attitude of ownership toward fans prior to Veeck can be gleaned from the dismissal by New York Yankees’ general manager George Weiss of a proposed marketing plan to distribute Yankee caps to young fans. “Do you think I want every youngster in New York City walking around wearing a Yankees’ cap?” snorted Weiss. Veeck made owners and administrators realize that this was exactly what they should want.

Although few people seemed to realize it, economics had yet to play its trump card in the game of professional sports. Economics is the study of giving people what they want the most in the most efficient way. What sports fans want the most is a winning team – and that is exactly what economics had failed to give them. It failed because it had never been deployed toward that end. Even Bill Veeck, despite his success in improving the on-field performance of his teams, had not unlocked the secret to using economic principles per se to win pennants and World Series.

As sometimes happens in human endeavor, baseball had to traverse a Dark Age before this secret was finally revealed.

The Dark Age: Municipal Subsidies and the Growth of Revenue Potential

During Bill Veeck’s swan song as baseball owner in 1975-1981, baseball had entered the period of free agency. The reserve clause tying players to a single team had been drastically modified, allowing players to eventually migrate to teams offering them the best financial terms. As we indicated earlier, this development – viewed in isolation – tilted the division of sports revenue from ownership to players.

This created the pretext by which owners were able to extract subsidies from municipalities throughout the nation. Owners could truthfully claim that they were earning less money as a result of free agency. What they left out was that they were earning more money for a host of other reasons. The obscure nature of player depreciation hid the true financial gains of sports-team ownership from the public. Moreover, the early years of free agency coincided with the advent of massive new revenue sources for owners. Television had brought baseball to millions of people who otherwise saw few games or none; broadcast rights were becoming a valuable asset of team ownership. Radio-broadcast rights increased in value as the increased visibility of teams and players enhanced their popularity. These increases were just gaining speed when the vogue of sports-team subsidies became a national pastime of its own.

The movement of baseball teams had long been viewed as analogous to the movement of businesses. Even the loss of popular teams like the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants to westward expansion of baseball in Los Angeles and San Francisco was grudgingly accepted, since baseball still remained in New York City and the Mets were added as an expansion franchise in 1962. But when the Athletics moved from Kansas City to Oakland in 1967, Missouri Senator Stuart Symington decided that the federal government could not countenance “unfettered capitalism” in the baseball business. He demanded that major-league baseball replace Kansas City’s lost franchise. This opened the floodgates to the intrusion of politics in baseball.

If it was fair for politicians to dictate where major-league baseball should operate, then franchises should be able to demand favors from local governments – or so reasoned baseball owners. And demand them they did.

Owners demanded that teams build new, larger, better-appointed stadiums for their sports teams. Cities should fund construction, own the stadiums, operate them, maintain them and lease them to the sports teams for peanuts – otherwise, owners would pack up and move to a city that would meet their demands.

What was in it for the host city? After all, not everybody is a sports fan. Owners sensed that they needed something to offer the city at large. Thus was born one of the great con games of the 20th century: the notion of sports as economic-development engine of growth. Owners seized on the same thinking that animated the dominant neo-Keynesian economic model. They sponsored “economic-impact studies” of the effect sports teams had on the local economy. In these studies, spending on sports took on a magical, mystical quality, as if jet-propelled by a multiplier ordained to send it rocketing through the local economy. And everybody “knew” that the more spending took place, the better off we all were.

It is hard to say what was worse, the economic logic of these studies or their statistical probity. It was not unusual to find that a study would add (say) the money spent on gasoline purchases at stations adjacent to the stadium to the “benefits” of sports team presence. Of course, this implies that locating the team as far as possible from the fans would increase the “benefits” dramatically; it is a case of cost/benefit analysis in which the costs are counted as benefits. This novel technique inevitably produces a finding of vast benefits.

As time went on, sale of team artifacts and memorabilia was added to the list of supplemental revenue. Larger stadiums, lucrative TV, radio and cable rights, team product sales – all these drove revenues to owners through the roof as the 20th century approached its close. With municipalities subsidizing the ownership, maintenance and improvement of stadiums, it is no wonder that the capital gains available to owners of sports teams were phenomenal. Ewing Kauffman bought the Kansas City Royals’ franchise for $1 million in 1968. At his death in 1993, the team’s value was estimated at well over $100 million.

One might have expected the usual left-wing suspects to recoil in horror from the income redistribution from ordinary taxpayers to rich owners and rich ballplayers – but no. Newspaper editorialists threw up their hands. The economists who supported free agency said that the major-market teams would get the best players, didn’t they? And hadn’t things worked out just that way, before free agency as well as after? If small-market taxpayers want to win – or even have a team at all – they’ll just have to ante up and face the fact that “this is how the game is played in today’s world.” Besides, doesn’t economic research show the economic-development benefits of sports teams?

Heretofore, economics had operated beneficially, albeit in a gradual, piecemeal way. Now the distortion of economics by the owners and their political allies meant that it was serving the ends of injustice.

Economics – and baseball fans – needed a hero. They got one – several, actually – from a pretty unlikely place.

Middle American Ingenuity to the Rescue

Bill James was born in tiny Holton, KS, in 1947. From childhood, he was a devoted sports fan. Like countless others before him, he was fascinated by the quantitative features of baseball and studied them obsessively. He was unique, though, in refusing to take on faith the value of conventional measures of baseball worth such as batting average, fielding average and runs batted in. James developed his own theories of baseball productivity and the statistical measures to back them up.

In 1977, he published the first edition of his Baseball Abstract, which subsequently became the Bible for his disciples and imitators. James was suspicious of batting average because it deliberately omitted credit for walks. (Ironically, walks were originally granted equivalent status with hits in computing batting average; “Tip” O’Neill’s famous top-ranking average of .485 in 1887 was accrued on this basis. The change to the modern treatment took place shortly thereafter.) While it may be technically true that a walk does not represent a “batting” accomplishment, it is certainly the functional equivalent of a single from the standpoint of run-producing productivity. (Veterans of youth baseball will recall their teammates urging them to wait out the opposing pitcher by chanting, “A walk’s as good as a hit, baby!”) Moreover, walks have many ancillary advantages. Putting the ball in play risks making an out. A walk forces the opposing pitcher to throw more pitches, thereby decreasing his effectiveness on net balance. Waiting longer in the count increases the chances that a hitter will get a more hittable pitch to hit, one that may be driven with power. For all these reasons, James made a convincing case that on-base percentage (OBP)is superior to batting average as a measure of a hitter’s run-producing productivity.

Rather than the familiar totals of home runs and runs batted in, James argued in favor of a more comprehensive measure of power production in hitting called slugging percentage (SP), defined as total bases divided by at bats. This includes all base hits, not just home runs. Instead of runs batted in, James created the category of runs created (RC), defined as hits plus walks times total bases, divided by plate appearances. James also sought a substitute for the concept of “fielding average,” which stresses the absence of errors committed on fielding chances actually handled but says nothing about the fielder’s ability or willingness to reach balls and execute difficult plays that other players may not even attempt. Moreover, fielding must be evaluated on the same level with offensive production since it must be just as valuable to prevent run production by the opposing team as to create runs for the home team.

These measures and maxims formed the core of Bill James’ theory of baseball productivity. His Baseball Abstract computed his measures for the major-league rosters each year and analyzed the play and management of the teams each year. Gradually, James became a cult hero. Others adopted his methods and measures. The Society for American Baseball Research (SABR) sprang up. The intensive study of quantitative baseball – eventually, sports in general – came to be known as “sabermetrics.” Even with all this attention, it still took decades for Bill James himself to be embraced by organized baseball itself. That, too, happened eventually, but not before sabermetrics left the realm of theory and invaded the pressbox, the front office and the very baseball diamond itself.

Moneyball Takes the Field

Billy Beane was a high-school “phenom” (short for phenomenal), a term denoting a player whose all-round potential is so patent that he “can’t miss” succeeding at the major-league level. Like a disconcerting number of others, though, Beane did miss. He played only minimally at the major-league level for a few years before quitting to become a scout. He rose to the front office and was named general manager of the Oakland Athletics in 1997. Beane’s mentor, general-manager Sandy Alderson, taught him the fundamentals of Bill James’ theories of baseball productivity. To them, Beane added his own observations about player development – notably, that baseball scouts cannot accurately evaluate the future prospects of players at the high-school level because their physical, emotional and mental development is still too limited to permit it. Thus, major-league teams should concentrate on drafting prospects out of college in order to improve their draft-success quotient.

Beane hired a young college graduate from HarvardUniversity – not as a player but as an administrative assistant. Paul DiPodesta was an economics major who was familiar with the logic of marginal productivity theory. The theory of the firm declares that managers should equalize the marginal productivity per dollar (that is, the ratio of output each unit of input produces at the margin to the input’s price) between inputs by continually adding more of any input with a higher ratio until the optimal output is reached. Of course, the problem in applying this or any other economic principle to baseball had always been that the principles were non-operational unless a meaningful measure of “output” could be found and the inputs contributing to that output could be identified. That was where Bill James and sabermetrics came in.

In 2001, the Oakland team had won the Western Division of the American League. But their star player, Jason Giambi, has been wooed away by a seven-year, $120-million dollar contract offered by the New York Yankees. It was the age-old story, the “Curse of the Bambino” all over again in microcosm. Oakland’s success had ramped up the value of its players on the open market; replacing those players with comparable talent at market rates would bust the payroll budget. Various other Oakland players were lost to injury or disaffection or free agency. Throughout baseball, opinion was unanimous that the Athletics were in for hard times until the team’s talent base could be rebuilt through player development.

Beane and DiPodesta used the most basic sabermetric concepts, such as ONB, SP and RC, as their measures of productivity. Using publicly available information about player salaries, they calculated player productivities per dollar and discovered the startling number of players whose true productivity was undervalued by their current salaries. Methodically, they set out to rebuild the Oakland Athletics “on the cheap” by acquiring the best players their budget could afford through trade or purchase of contracts. They substantially remade the team using this approach. Despite a slow start, their rebuilt club eventually tied the all-time major-league baseball record by winning 21 straight games and successfully defended the Western Division championship in 2002 and 2003. Author Michael Lewis outlined their story and the rise of sabermetrics in baseball in his 2003 best-selling book Moneyball, which later became a 2011 movie starring Brad Pitt that received six Academy Award nominations.

For the first time, baseball management had explicitly used an economic production function – marginal productivity theory with an operational definition of product or output – to maximize a meaningful object function – namely, “wins” by the team. And they succeeded brilliantly.

Money See, Money Do

In 2003, new Boston Red Sox owner John Henry hired Bill James as a consultant to management, to put the theories of sabermetrics into practice in Boston. During 2001 and 2002, the team had lugged the second-highest payroll in major-league baseball to disappointing results. But in 2003, with a lower- (6th-) ranked payroll, the Boston Red Sox laid the ghost of Babe Ruth by winning their first World Series since 1918. Over the succeeding decade, the Red Sox became the success story of baseball, winning the World Series three more times.

Was this a case of what Rocky’s manager Mickey would call “freak luck?” Not hardly. Thanks to the success of Oakland and Boston and Michael Lewis’s book, the tale of Bill James and sabermetrics traveled. Throughout baseball, sabermetrics ran wild and economics reigned triumphant. In 2003, the Detroit Tigers lost an American-League-record 119 games. In 2006, with only the 14th-highest payroll out of 30 major-league teams, the Tigers won the American League championship. In 2008 and 2009, the Washington Nationals were the worst team in baseball. In 2012, with baseball’s 20th-highest payroll, they had baseball’s best record. In 2010, the Pittsburgh Pirates lost 105 games. In 2013, with baseball’s 20th-highest payroll, they made the post-season playoffs. The Cleveland Indians rebounded from sub-.500 seasons to playoff finishes twice between 2006 and 2014, despite never ranking higher than 15th in the size of their payroll; usually, they ranked between 20th and 26th.

The crowning achievement was that of the perennial cellar-dwelling Tampa Bay Devil Rays. Cellar-dwelling, that is, in the size of their payroll, but not necessarily in the season standings. After years of dismal finishes, the 2008 TampaBay team became American League champs despite ranking 29th (next to last!) in the size of their payroll. They have made the playoffs in four of the six subsequent years, but their payroll continues to languish at the bottom of the major-league rankings.

The New Frontier

Does this mean that the generalization about large-market teams getting the better players and enjoying the better results was and is a lie? No, it was and still is true. But like all economic propositions it is subject to qualification and careful statement.

First, it is a ceteris paribus proposition. It is true that “you can’t beat the stock market (averages)” but every year some people (particularly professional investors) do it. You can’t do it systematically by trading on the basis of publicly available information. The few people who succeed do it on the basis of (unsystematic) luck or by uncovering new information (legally) before it becomes generally known. The market for professional sports is not nearly this efficient; techniques of sports productivity evaluation are not nearly as refined and efficient as those of stock evaluation and trading, which leaves much more room for systematic exploitation by techniques like those of sabermetrics.

Second, the term “large market” is no longer limited by geography as it has been during the first century and a half of U.S. professional sports. Ted Turner’s promotion of the Atlanta Braves using his cable-TV stations blazed the trail for turning a local team into a national one, thereby increasing the value of the team’s broadcasting and product rights. Today, there is no inherent geographic limitation of the size of the market for any team – no reason, for example, why the Kansas City Royals or Chiefs could not become “the world’s team” and sit atop the largest market of all.

The Evolutionary Approach to Free Markets

The correct approach to economics is not the irrationalist view that has clouded our understanding of professional sports. Neither is it the perfectionist view of the ChicagoSchool, which has oversold the virtues of free markets and damaged their credibility. It is certainly not the remedial view of the neo-Keynesian school, which has failed whenever and wherever tried and is now undergoing its latest serial failure.

The evolutionary approach of the true free-market school, so nobly outlined by Hayek and his disciples, fits the history of baseball like a batting glove. It is now in full flower. Taxpayers need no longer be violated by owners who promote false economic benefits of sports and hide the real ones. Fans no longer need languish in a limbo of psychological unfulfillment. Economics – not politicians, regulators or academic scribblers – has come to the rescue at last.